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Abstract
JABLONSKI, ALEKSANDER KAROL. Optimum Currency Areas and the European
Experience: An Examination of Diverging Competitiveness among Key EU Nations
Department of Economics
ADVISOR: Eshragh Motahar
Now, in its 18th year of existence, the European single currency – the most daring act of
integration since the launch of the European integration project – is facing its biggest challenge
yet. Greece, Portugal and Ireland are still experiencing economic hardships, even after receiving
substantial bailout packages in order to avoid defaulting on their debt. Italy and Spain – the third
and fourth largest economies in the Eurozone – are close behind, combining high public debts,
large budget deficits, and low growth. Germany and France, considered the most robust
economies of the Eurozone, are feeling the strain of supporting their weaker partners, in an
attempt to save the euro. The economic importance of this crisis is that the future of Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurozone, and the European economic integration is at stake.
After a decade of economic preparations and convergence in light of optimal currency
area criteria, these Eurozone countries had an extraordinary opportunity to pave the way for
rapid economic development and modernization, with sustainable growth rates, and new, open
and high quality economic and political institutions after joining this common currency area.
Although the economic environment was truly favorable, the ability to exploit these advantages
properly for countries, specifically the PIIG countries, was largely based on two major
conditions: maintain fiscal discipline and sound finances, while increasing the productivity and
the competitiveness of their respective economies. Despite all the PIIG countries failing to
maintain fiscal discipline, certain PIIG countries, such as Greece, failed to maintain
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competiveness in international markets through depressing wages and productivity enhancement.
After the examination of productivity, unit labor costs, hourly wage rates, and net export
performance as a percentage of GDP of Germany, France, and PIIG countries, I find that certain
member countries, such as Greece, would be better off leaving the Eurozone, allowing it to
regain control over its exchange rate in order to restore its competitiveness in international
markets.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and euro was the dream of many a politician
in the years following WWII. This dream soon became a reality through Europe’s bold
experiment in kick starting a long, slow process that ultimately led to the creation of the EMU. It
is important to note that long before the EMU and euro was even developed, the theory of
optimum currency areas was brought into the world of economics through Mundell (1961). His
theory of optimum currency areas argues the optimal area for a system of fixed exchange rates is
on that is highly economically integrated. More specifically, economic integration means free
flows of trade, labor, as well as both financial and physical capital.
Optimal currency area theory has evolved expansively since Mundell coined this theory.
Much of the literature came before the Eurozone had actually taken place, demonstrating that
traditionalist scholars, such as McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), developed their arguments
and suggested criteria in forming an optimal currency area without a functioning model. The
three influential traditional scholars introduced economic conditions, such as labor mobility and
wage and price flexibility, varying level of developments, such as economic production
structures, or differing sector diversification regarding trade, all of which are considered relevant
attributes for judging the optimality of a currency area. Moreover, once the European Union
embarked on a monetary unification process, modern scholars have contributed to optimal
currency literature by trying to fill in the gaps left by traditionalist scholars in determining
whether the benefits of the Eurozone will outweigh the costs in the long run. Since the majority
of existing literature has addressed theory of optimal currency areas in lack of practical
implications, as well as in response to the development of the Eurozone, limited work has been
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produced in examining whether or not the Eurozone is operating as an optimal currency area
concerning the current crisis.
The EMU project was the most decisive step in the process of European integration and
cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established this EMU project, as well as set the
criteria for its implementation. This treaty outlined convergence criteria integration regarding
achieving exchange rate stability, price stability, and maintaining a restrictive fiscal policy for
EU countries in becoming an EMU. The goal behind these convergence criteria was the smooth
adoption of the new common currency, which required a significant harmonization of economic
policies and macroeconomic conditions in the countries that wanted to participate in the EU.
Moreover, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established thereafter in 1997 to ensure that
the Maastricht Convergence Criteria would continue to apply once the common currency was
launched. This pact was meant to ensure that no single member state, once a member of EMU,
could free ride the system, for instance, by incurring high deficits and debt. It also aimed to
enforce budget discipline and sound public finances among the countries participating in the
euro. It is important to note that some EU members have not ratified all of the clauses before
entering the Eurozone, indicating the weaknesses in the Maastricht Treaty, as well as the
Stability and Growth Pact. Despite the fiscal and monetary harmonization in the late 1990s, large
economic, structural and institutional disparities were still in place, and continued to exist after
the creation of the Eurozone, which we will discuss in further detail in Chapter Three. Finally,
after years of adjustment and convergence, the euro was adopted on January 1, 1999.
Furthermore, after the birth of the euro, economists believed that reforms pertaining to
improving labor market, wage, and price flexibility, would emerge from participation in a shared
common currency area with a fixed exchange rate. Though Eurozone nations did show promise
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in positively converging towards meeting several of the optimal currency area criteria,
specifically with respect to trade, certain nations were not able to implement adequate labor
market reforms, despite undertaking competitive real exchange rates that they had no control of.
The reasoning behind this lack of responsiveness was due to the unaccounted excessive pressures
from political economy forces, distorted incentives, as well as the “dependency on the perception
of unlimited capacity to borrow based on implicit euro zone guarantee” according to Wihlborg
(2010, p. 25). Therefore, incentives for not only maintaining fiscal discipline, but also more
importantly, productivity reforms were very weak, especially in the case for Greece.
Deciding to join the Eurozone also resulted in fixed exchange rates between all
participating countries. The costs of entering the EU for these countries was forgoing an
independent exchange rate and no longer having an independent monetary policy, where
sovereign governments can no longer manage the exchange rate so as to address the country’s
international competitiveness issues nor can they influence the money supply so as to address
aggregate demand and/or inflation/deflation problems. These member states can therefore only
compete in international markets with their fixed exchange rates where adjusting unit labor costs
is their main option. To be more specific, in order to address international competitiveness
issues, the only two options left under the Eurozone are wage decreases and/or productivity
enhancements.
Moreover, in this thesis, we will be examining the four variables to determine if
sufficient, positive economic convergence and performance in terms of international
competitiveness under the uniform policy of the ECB occurred for Germany, France, and PIIG
countries since joining the Eurozone. It is important to understand of the relationship between
the following under a fixed exchange rate regime like the Eurozone: (1) productivity, (2) unit
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labor costs, (3) export price indices, and (4) net export performance as a percentage of GDP. To
begin, the relationship between productivity and unit labor costs is that if unit labor costs rate is
growing faster than rate of productivity, we have a competiveness problem. This indicates that
the unit labor costs are too expensive for that country to be competitive in international markets
as the per unit labor cost exceeds the per unit productivity. Now, for example, say workers in
Region A are less competitive than workers in Region B via productivity rates, Region A can
turn to depress their worker’s wages and/or productivity enhancement in order to reduce its cost
of production to restore its competiveness in the international market. It is important to note that
no currency devaluation can be performed since the country is under a fixed rate regime (e.g. the
Eurozone). Furthermore, the decrease in wages causes unit labor costs to decrease, making the
nation’s export price indices more competitive, or a decrease in its export price, and therefore
increasing its net export performance as a percentage of GDP. However, as we will see later on
in this thesis, a nation left with only the adjustment mechanisms of wage depression and/or
productivity enhancement may not always be sufficient in maintaining and/or increasing its net
export performance as percentage of GDP given its membership in a fixed rate regime.
This thesis will be structured as follow. Chapter Two will review prior literature
pertinent to the traditional views on the optimal currency area theory, followed by the modern
views on the optimal currency area theory. This chapter demonstrates that a nation’s cost and
benefits from joining a fixed exchange rate regime such as the EMU depend on how integrated
its economy is with those of potential members. Chapter Three will introduce the institutional
background and convergence criteria leading up to the Eurozone, followed by an examination of
the fiscal conditions and structural issues after its implementation. Chapter Four will present an
analysis of the current account balances, productivity, unit labors costs, and hourly wage rates in
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Germany, France, and the PIIG countries under the Eurozone. Chapter Five will provide
concluding remarks and considerations for follow up.
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CHAPTER TWO
Chronology of Deviating Economic Literature exploring OCAs

2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the wide range of literature to the theory of optimum currency areas.
Subsection 2.2 addresses the traditional views on the optimal currency area theory, followed by
the modern views on the optimal currency area theory in subsection 2.3. The traditional
contributors have developed relevant approaches in determining the way attributes of countries’
economies can influence the monetary efficiency gain of forming, or joining, an optimal
exchange-rate regime. The modern contributors further developed research in light of the
creation of European Union embarked on a monetary unification process, trying to fill in the
gaps left by traditionalist scholars in determining whether the benefits of the Eurozone will
outweigh the costs in the long run.

2.2 Traditional views on the OCA Theory
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and euro was the dream of many a politician
in the years following WWII. Long before the EMU and euro were even developed, the theory of
optimum currency areas was coined into the world of economics through Mundell. Before
Mundell (1961) shed light on this topic, each country, traditionally, has sustained its own
independent, national currency. It is important to note that the time period during which
Mundell’s paper was written characterized by the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime, in
addition to limited international capital mobility. Friedman (1953) played a significant role in
spurring interest with respect to optimal currency areas, as he addressed the commonly debated
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topic on the benefits and shortcomings of floating exchange rates. Friedman strongly argued for
floating exchange rates because they serve as an adjusting mechanism in bringing the balance of
crisis in the light of changes in aggregate demand, “averting the balance of payments crises that
[he] believed were an inherent feature of fixed- but adjustable rate” as quoted in Dellas and
Tavlas (2009, p. 8). He continued to observe that choosing a fixed exchange allows each country
to pursue its own independent monetary policy, safeguarding each country in being wrapped in
the monetary mistakes of others. Finally, Friedman (1953, p. 157-8) points out that fixed
exchange rates hinder international trade, while floating exchange rates allow countries to
remove exchange controls quickly, therefore promoting international trade and the wealth
created by the multilateral division of labor. Friedman’s work about the choice of exchange rates,
in strong favor of a floating regime, in the early 1950s played a significant role in reviving
interest in optimum-currency-area analysis.
The primary contributor to the optimal currency area academia is Mundell (1961), who
tried to not only refute Friedman’s argument for floating exchange rates, but also explores the
characteristics of a country’s economy to determine whether or not countries should have
separate currencies. Mundell begins by describing an optimum currency area as an optimal
region for a common currency that is highly integrated with regards to free flows of goods and
services, assets and physical capital, as well as labor mobility. It is important to note that optimal
currency areas have costs and benefits for countries deciding whether to adhere to them. Mundell
states that a region is considered optimal if its monetary efficiency gains exceed the costs of
sharing a common currency. One significant monetary efficiency gain that occurs when an
economy joins an optimal currency area is the low transaction costs. In joining a common
currency area, Mundell demonstrates that countries avoid the uncertainty and international
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transaction costs that incur when doing business transactions that different floating exchange
rates involve. Therefore, since transaction costs are greatly reduced, trade becomes extensive
between the member countries in the optimal currency area.
Furthermore, Mundell’s developed theory addresses the fact that the monetary efficiency
gain of joining a common currency area depends on the amount of economic integration. Taking
a step back, Mundell’s objective was to indicate what criteria would make the abandonment of a
floating exchange rate regime less costly in the long run than suggested by Friedman. The
distinguishing difference between Mundell and Friedman was that Mundell emphasized factor
mobility integration as a necessary criterion to achieving an optimal currency area. The reason
for this factor mobility, especially labor mobility, is that it serves as the adjustment mechanism
in maintaining internal and external balance in the face of changes in inflation and employment
due to shift of demand of products between regions. However, Mundell (1961, p. 659) points out
that “the optimum currency area is not the world”, indicating that this adjustment mechanism
only effectively works when national borders are redrawn to create optimal geographical
regional areas with high labor mobility. Therefore, as stated by Broz (2005, p 55), the greater the
labor mobility, when wages and prices are not flexible, within a region, “then that region should
have a fixed exchange rate within its borders and flexible exchange rate” with each optimal
regional area.
Finally, Mundell proposed the criteria of wage and price flexibility on top of labor
mobility among the members in a common currency area. The importance of this attribute
regarding an optimum currency area presented by Broz (2005, p. 55) is shown in simplified
scenario where the assumptions of two regions “which are not defined by national producers but
as a group of producers that produce only homogenous products.” In this setup, if there is an
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increase demand in for products from one region, let’s call it region A, to another region, let’s
call it region B, then region A would increase wages as a response, leading to decrease in
aggregate supply and an increase in price level. Region B would see a decrease demand, and
experience the inverse of the chain of reactions given its membership in the common currency.
Both regions would buy fewer products in Region A, while more products in Region B, thus
demonstrating that the flexibility of wages and prices makes it easier to restore stability in the
incident of asymmetric shocks in a common currency area. On the other side of the spectrum, if
there is internal labor immobility, as well as wage and price stickiness, Mundell argues for a
flexible exchange rate mechanism and autonomous monetary policies in those two particular
areas. The relevance of this case is that Mundell identifies the incidence of asymmetric shocks in
exchange of the variables previously mentioned in judging whether it is optimal for two regions
to form a common currency area.
Mundell’s important contribution to the theory of optimum currency areas spurred
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) to further identify characteristics when countries, or
regions, are considering joining a fixed rate regime. McKinnon (1963) identified additional key
criteria on top of Mundell’s work that economies of the members of the common currency area
should possess in order to for the benefits to outweigh the costs of joining a fixed exchange rate
system. The traditionalist scholar states that the openness of the economy in terms of the ratio of
tradables to non-tradeables is extremely important with regards to adapting a fixed exchange
rate. McKinnon (1963, p. 57) justifies this through examining how “when there is a higher
degree of openness in the economy, the likelihood that foreign prices of tradables to the domestic
cost of living is higher.” This demonstrates that fluctuations in nominal exchange rates will lead
to influential offsetting changes in wages and prices in an open economy, depriving the floating
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exchange rate of its effectiveness in changing the terms of trade in addition to its function as an
adjustment mechanism.
The bottom line from McKinnon’s examination is that the more open the economy is, the
more arguments there are for joining a fixed exchange rate. The emphasis of the openness
criteria leads to his point that open economies should pursue a fixed exchange rate. He suggests
that open economies that frequently trade with each other should form a common currency area,
since the monetary efficiency gain from the safeguarding of exchange rate fluctuations in this
closed region would outweigh the costs of joining this regime.
Moreover, McKinnon addresses that a smaller economy would benefit more in joining a
large common currency area than large economy. The reasoning behind this is that the smaller
economy is more likely to be open due to the fact that it not as self-sufficient as a larger
economy. It is important to note that a small economy typically produces goods it has a
comparative advantage in, while engaging in international trade for the rest of the goods it needs.
Since a large part of its GDP is engaged in foreign trade, it displays how variations in the
exchange rate influence a large portion of its economy. Overall, McKinnon’s contribution not
only emphasizes the role of the size of an economy in forming an optimal currency area, but also
demonstrates that the benefit forming a common currency area with fixed exchange rates is that
it buffers the effects of exchange rate fluctuations.
The final significant contributor to the development of the optimum currency area was
Kenen (1969). This traditionalist scholar proposed that the product diversification of the
economy is extremely important attribute with regards to forgoing an independent monetary
policy and adjustable exchange rate regime for an optimal fixed exchange rate regime. Kenen
(1969, p. 49) argues that the degree of product diversification, “the number of single-product
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regions contained in a single country, may be more relevant than labour mobility” with regards
to optimal currency area criterion. It important to note he introduced this new reason in the light
that he did not believe that perfect labor mobility exists. Kenen’s examination of this tenet is that
if a single-product economy, which also exports its only product, experiences a negative demand
shock in a fixed-rate regime, it does not have the luxury of depreciating its exchange rate in order
to address the fall in export revenue. The adjustment to this situation under a fixed exchange rate
regime would have to be unfavorably tackled through a reduction of wages and prices, or even
increase unemployment, since currency devaluation is not an option. Hence, Kenen argues that
an optimal exchange rate regime is more attractive to highly diversified economies rather than
single, or limited, diversified economies. The reasoning behind this as stated by Della and Tavlas
(2009, p. 19) is that “diversification provides some insulation from effects of sector-specific or
industry-specific shocks, forestalling the need of frequent terms-of-trade via the exchange rate.”
Kenen furthers his point of view by arguing that highly diversified economies should be
supplemented with a diversified export sector. Extending on McKinnon’s (1963) size of the
economy criterion, Kenen demonstrates that highly diversified export economies are usually
large economies due to their self-sufficient nature, while less diversified export economies are
typically smaller economies. It is important to note that smaller, less diversified export
economies need a higher degree of openness concerning importing goods in demand, and then
exporting goods in return to be able to pay for their imports. Thus, Broz (2005, p. 59) points out
“Kenen’s diversification criterion can be transformed into McKinnon’s openness criterion.”
Kenen also adds onto Mundell’s argument that economies vulnerable to asymmetric
shocks should pursue flexible exchange rates, as the costs of forgoing an independent monetary
policy are higher the lower the association of shocks is between the regions. He explores the fact
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that, given a high degree of labor mobility, it is optimal for two economies, which have similar
production characteristics, to form a common currency union, as they are likely to experience
similar industry specific shocks. Kenen also believes that fiscal integration should be a
characteristic in assessing the optimality of two economies participating in common currency
area. Furthering his point of view, Della and Tavlas (2009, p. 18) state that if an asymmetric
shock hits a single currency area, the higher the levels of fiscal integration between regions, and
“the greater the ability to smooth asymmetric shocks through fiscal transfers from a lowemployment region to a high-unemployment region.” On top this important viewpoint; Kenen
ultimately demonstrates his ability to develop the insights of both Mundell and McKinnon in his
argument pertaining to his most important attributes regarding optimum currency areas.
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) are consistently viewed as the
most important traditionalist scholars on the optimum currency area theory. These traditional
contributors have developed relevant approaches in determining the way attributes of countries’
economies can influence the monetary efficiency gain of forming, or joining, an optimal
exchange-rate regime. Mundell addressed the degree of labor mobility, wage and price
flexibility, as well as the incidence of asymmetric shocks as the most important variables for
judging whether it is optimal for two economies to form a currency union. McKinnon, on the
other hand, argued the degree of openness in addition to the size of the economy were crucial
factors in forming a common currency area. Kenen soon after identified characteristics
pertaining to the degree of product diversification, similarity of production structures, and the
level of fiscal integration that potential economies should ideally possess in forming a common
currency area. With all this being said, the framework developed by these three authors was
neither thoroughly developed nor consistent.
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2.3 Modern views on the OCA Theory
The theory of optimum currency areas was more of an academic question, as these three
authors developed their works in a time characterized by the Bretton Woods exchange rate
regime in addition to limited international capital mobility. Mundell (1961, 657) even mentioned
that this theory was more of an academic question, “since it hardly appears within the realm of
political feasibility that national currencies would ever be abandoned in favor of any other
arrangement.” Nonetheless, the theory has evolved since these three influential papers, and a
second wave of contributor renewed interest into the optimal currency area field since the
European Union embarked on a monetary unification process. Following a period of stagnation
in optimal currency area literature from the second half of 1970s to early 1990s, more recent
scholars have developed research in light of this practical example, trying to fill in the gaps left
by traditionalist scholars in determining whether or not the benefits of the Eurozone will
outweigh the costs in the long run. Modern scholars typically recognize the possibility of the
reverse occurring, where the costs of participating in a common currency area outweigh the
benefits, yet they still propose solutions for further monetary integration.
A good place in examining what issues recent optimal currency literature deals with is
starting with the importance of labor mobility. Even though Mundell (1961) was the first to
address the significance of labor mobility, Paul De Grauwe (2003) furthers this discussion by
demonstrating the significance of different labor institutions with regards to optimal currency
areas. De Grauwe points out that there could be three types of labor market centralization: (1)
labor markets in which highly centralized unions dominate, (2) labor markets with intermediate
union centralization, and (3) labor markets where unions are decentralized. Broz (2005, p. 68)
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further demonstrates De Grauwe’s viewpoint by explaining that in markets where centralized
unions dominate, or where there is wage bargaining centralization, “a supply shock will not lead
to an excessive increase in nominal wages, since unions know that excessive wage increases will
lead to more inflation, making real wages the same as before.” The same outcome goes for labor
markets where unions are decentralized, as market unions at company level will not start the
wage bargaining process when a supply shock hits due to the same logic.
Labor markets that have intermediate union centralization, on the other hand, have
different approach to supply shocks. According to Broz (2005, p. 69), a labor union in this
market starts the wage bargaining process in light of a supply shock, since all the unions will be
taking the same route, even though each unions knows that “its actions will have but a small
effect on aggregate inflation.” It is important to note the members will end up with lower real
wages than its counterparts will if its labor union does not push for higher wages. The excessive
increase in nominal wages will lead further nominal inflation, making real wages the same as
before. The acknowledgment of this criterion by De Grauwe demonstrates that it will be harder
to adjust to a similar shock in a similar way in a common currency area when differences in labor
market institutions exist. This is important because the difference between labor market
institutions can cause the need for a different approach to the monetary policy.
In determining whether to enter a common currency area, Alesina, et al., addressed the
attributes of correlation of shocks in addition stabilization policy. They argue that the higher the
association of shocks between a potential member of a common currency area, or client, and the
so-called anchor, the more attractive joining a common currency area is for the client. This
relationship suggests that the policy selected by the anchor will be suitable for the client when it
is hit by a shock. Alesina, et al., (2002, p. 309) go on to discredit the importance behind the
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similarity of shocks, emphasizing the “variance of the client’s country’s output expressed as a
ration to the anchor country’s output.” This viewpoint demonstrates that even though a small
country may be highly correlated in terms of output with an anchor, such as the European
Monetary Union, if its variance of output is much greater than the anchors, then the cost of
losing its independent monetary policy in exchange of joining a shared currency might not be
worth it. The monetary policy of the anchor, or the European Central Banks, might not be
suitable for the client when facing a shock. This analysis ultimately deemphasize Kenen’s (1969)
argument that it is optimal for two economies, which have similar industry characteristics, to
form a common currency union, as they are likely to experience correlated shocks.
Additionally, the viewpoint by Kenen (1969) that the higher the degree of fiscal
integration between regions in an optimal currency area, the greater the ability it has in
mitigating the asymmetric shock through fiscal transfers has proven to be too simplistic in
practical terms. De Grauwe (2007) begins refuting this notion of a flexible fiscal adjustment
through pointing out the unintended consequences of using fiscal transfers in response to a
permanent shock hitting a common currency area. The unintended consequence of this situation
is that the fiscal transfers would permanently shift the resources to the affected region,
preventing necessary adjustment. It is important to note that issues pertaining controlling debt
may arise through the continuous use of fiscal transfers. These two reasons also demonstrate that
constraints may arise in the future from the use of fiscal transfers in the present. Dellas and
Tavlas (2009, p. 24) demonstrate that De Grauwe addresses the situation where “a country with
large fiscal deficits and a high debt-to-GDP ratio that is in a monetary union can create negative
spillover effects for the rest of the union, driving the union’s interest rate upwards and increasing
the burden of financing government debts in the other members of the union.” De Grauwe’s
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argument supports implementing fiscal rules, instead utilizing fiscal transfers, in containing the
size of budget deficits and government debt of weaker countries within a common currency area,
as it reduces the negative spillover effects.
Additionally, Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) discussed the
attributes, such as, labor mobility and the openness of the economy, regarding optimal currency
areas, but did not address if a single monetary policy can handle the asymmetric economic
developments within different countries once they share a common currency area. Kroger and
Redonnet (2001) explain the consequences of having asymmetric developed economies in a
shared common currency area through an example where one country is a mature economy with
high per capita income, while the other country is at an early stage of development with low per
capita income. If a regional bank has been tasked with obtaining price stability, given that these
two countries have formed a common currency area, the country at the early stage of
development could face low interest in addition to high-expected rates of return on investment.
These factors alongside free capital mobility according to Dellas and Tavlas (2009, p. 24) can
lead to “overly-optimistic income expectations, a ‘‘wrong’’ incentive structure of investment
(i.e., investment in high-risk projects that would not have been undertaken in the absence of low
interest rates) and excessive domestic demand; and in light of the above, the economy concerned
may eventually be faced with the need to undergo a prolonged deflation in order to regain
competitiveness.” This argument emphasizes the use of real convergence criteria as a means of
determining prospective members into a common currency area, since different developed
economies might be more suitable under a regime of an autonomous monetary policy.
Finally, whereas the traditional framework on the theory of optimal currency area
addressed the criteria an economy should meet before joining a common, while modern scholars
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focused on changes in economic structure that may result from participation in a shared common
currency area. This topic that recent scholars have addressed is called endogenous optimumcurrency area theory. Frankel and Rose (1997) demonstrate that not only is there a positive
relationship between trade integration and income correlation, but also that increased trade in
common currency area leads to more highly correlated business cycles. This relationship
between trade integration and business synchronization exists due to the high accounts of intraindustry trade or common demand shocks. Since countries forming a common currency have
highly correlated business cycles, they will not need flexible exchange rates as an adjustment
mechanism. This endogenous optimum-currency area theory demonstrates that participating in a
common currency area outweighs the benefits of independent monetary policy since it reduces
the frequency of asymmetric shocks, instead of focusing on the incidence of shocks as a criterion
for entering a common currency by the traditionalist framework.

2.4 Conclusion
After 55 years since the Mundell’s (1961) paper, the optimal currency area theory has
evolved. Much of the literature came before the Maastricht Treaty, and before the Eurozone had
actually taken place, demonstrating that scholars developed their arguments and suggested
criteria in forming an optimal currency area in light of no practical examples. The three
influential traditional scholars introduced economic conditions (such as labor mobility and wage
and price flexibility), varying level of developments (such as economic production structures and
size of the economy), or differing sector diversification with regards to production and exports,
all of which are considered relevant attributes for judging the optimality of a currency area.
Modern scholars have contributed to optimal currency literature through identifying the gaps that
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traditionalist scholars have overlooked. With the luxury of a working model, these scholars
addressed the limits of fiscal policy, differences in the level of economic developments between
countries, various labor institutions, correlation of shocks, as well as endogenous optimumcurrency area theory. Given that existing literature has addressed theory of optimal currency
areas in lack of practical implications, as well as in response to the development of the Eurozone,
limited work has been produced in examining whether or not the Eurozone is operating as an
optimal currency area with regards to the current crisis.
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CHAPTER THREE
From the Years of Adjustment to the Crisis: Understanding the Root Causes

3.1 Introduction
After 3 years of working with the euro as “book money” alongside national currencies,
euro coins and banknotes were launched on January 1st, 2002 and the biggest cash changeover in
history took place. The economies of the Eurozone enjoyed matching low interest rates and
stable economic growth for almost a decade after the euro was officially launched on January 1st,
1999. However, as the fallout of the global economic crises escalated in 2009, European markets
became susceptible to the frightening levels of public debt in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Greece,
skyrocketing interest rates, and fears of sovereign debt defaults. Now, in its 16th year of
existence, the European single currency – the most daring act of integration since the launch of
the European integration project – is facing its biggest challenge yet. Greece and Portugal are
still experiencing economic hardships, even after receiving substantial bailout packages in order
to avoid defaulting on their debt. Moreover, Italy and Spain – the third and fourth largest
economies in the Eurozone - are also experiencing high public debts, large budget deficits, and
low growth. Germany and France, considered the most robust economies of the Eurozone, are
feeling the strain of supporting their weaker partners, in an attempt to save the euro. The
economic importance of this crisis is that the future of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
the Eurozone, and the European economic integration is at stake.
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3.2 Institutional Background & Convergence Criteria
It has taken more than 30 years to create the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and
Eurozone. The EMU project was the most decisive step in the process of European integration
and cooperation. This long, slow process ultimately led to the creation of a single monetary
policy, a new European Central Bank, and a new single currency. To begin, the Maastricht
Treaty of 1992 paved the way for the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the circulation of euro
notes and coins in 2002. The treaty established the EMU project and set the requirements for the
gradual implementation of the EMU. This major step forward was largely based on the
objectives of maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in the early 1990s. The goal behind this
convergence was the smooth adoption of the new common currency, which required a significant
harmonization of economic policies and macroeconomic conditions in the countries that wanted
to participate in the EU. Participating in this core European integration project was largely seen
as the most appropriate pathway for economic prosperity.
More specifically, the Maastricht Treaty outlined convergence criteria for the third stage
of integration regarding achieving exchange rate stability, price stability, and maintaining a
restrictive fiscal policy for EU countries in becoming an economic and monetary union
according to Krugman (2015, p. 564). It is important to note that major economic problems and
imbalances in one country could bring about problems to other countries. For this reason, the
convergence policy period was the preparation stage for the countries. The several
macroeconomics criteria included: (1) inflation of no more than 1.5 percentage points above the
average rate of the three EU member states with the lowest national inflation rates among EU
members over the previous year, (2) long term interest rates that should be no more than 1.5 %
points above the rate in the three EU countries with the lowest inflation over the previous year,
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(3) a national government deficit at or below 3% of GDP, and (4) a national government debt not
exceeding 60% of GDP, although a country with a higher level of debt can still adopt the euro
provided its debt level is falling steadily. And finally, the European Central Bank with the
authority to exercise the monetary policy for the entire EMU was established, where the
independent monetary policies no longer would be available after the adoption of the euro
currency.
Furthermore, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established thereafter in 1997 to
ensure that the Maastricht Convergence Criteria would continue to apply once the common
currency was launched. This pact was meant to ensure that no single member state, once a
member of EMU, could free ride the system, for instance, by incurring high deficits and debt. It
also aimed to enforce budget discipline and sound public finances among the countries
participating in the euro. The SGP also was to govern the “excessive” debt and deficit procedure,
which would be triggered by the national government deficit breaching 3% of GDP or national
government debt nearing 60% of GDP. If countries did not follow these criteria, the SGP
allowed for financial penalties on countries with “excessive” deficits or debts.
The significance behind the macroeconomic convergence criteria, the strict control of
high public debts, as well the further addition of the SGP was that low-inflation countries, such
as Germany and France, wanted to assurance that other EMU counterparts would not only learn
to prefer an environment of fiscal discipline, but also not exert excess inflationary pressure on
the entire European economy. This environment was encouraged in hopes of preventing the euro
in becoming a weak currency, not falling prey to the types of policies that fueled inflation in
several European countries since the early 1970s. Having a controlled debt and deficit would
also prevent the continuation of borrowing that may lead to decreased demand for its bonds.
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Moreover, even as the euro launch came closer in 1997, the German public was opposed to the
euro because of the opinion that strong, cautious governments in the EMU would face pressures
to purchase debt from governments that borrowed more than they could afford to repay. The
German government insisted that the criteria outlined in the Maastricht Treaty alongside the
SGP’s criteria post-implementation of the Eurozone would prevent this from happening,
fostering an environment with low inflation and fiscal restraint.
Ironically, by the mid-1990s it became apparent that many countries, including the largest
- and economically most important – Germany and France, were finding it difficult to meet the
convergence criteria. At first, it was decided that only Austria, Denmark, Portugal, the
Netherlands and Spain fulfilled the convergence criteria, while France and Germany did not
fulfill the criteria. It was inconceivable to launch EMU without the two strongest economies. In
the run-up to 1998, a facade of similarity and congruence between member states’ economies
struggling to fulfill the criteria occurred. EU countries, such as Germany and France, through the
means of “cooking the books” and using creative accounting squeezed their government budget
deficits to within the 3% of GDP criteria by the Maastricht treaty. On other hand, countries, such
as Italy and Greece, had levels of debt and deficit relative to GDP well above the limit of the
treaty. The treaty, nonetheless, dismissed these circumstances given the fact that these countries
were demonstrating that the level of debt was declining. Eventually, in May 1998, the Council
decided 11 countries were ready to join.

3.3 Unfolding the Eurozone Crisis
The creation of the euro was once again largely stimulated by political consideration in
addition to economic policy priorities extrictably linked to the fulfillment of the Maastricht
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Criteria. Main economic trends in the post euro period-included poor governance and fiscal
expansion, which were supposed to be supervised by the European Commission. This
demonstrated that the greatest weakness of the SGP was the fact that a qualified majority of
Eurozone members in its ECOFIN Council was required in order to approve any further
procedural steps. The weakness meant that countries that were in violation of the criteria retained
the right to vote and needed only a few additional countries to block such steps, hence
incentivizing countries with high levels of deficits “to vote against sanctions for fear that these
would be applied against themselves” according to Ngai (2012, p. 2).
The EC not only failed to impose the appropriate penalties, but also set a negative
precedent, a bad signal that there were no effective rules on budget deficits in the EMU. Despite
the SGP obligations, especially running fiscal deficits no more than 3% of GDP, there was a
significant fiscal deterioration for the PIIG countries from the early 2000s onwards after entering
the common currency area. These observations can be seen in Figure 3.1 and 3.2:
Figure 3.1

Source: OCED (See Appendix 1 for more detail)
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Figure 3.2

Source: OCED (See Appendix 2 for more detail)
These graphs clearly show that the SGP failed to impose strict requirements to member states.
Instead of a gradual convergence, divergence emerged since there were good performers and
laggards in the Eurozone. Moreover, the fiscal relaxation was not only strictly an economic
reality in the PIIG countries, but also among stronger Eurozone economies like Germany and
France. The negative precedent set by both Germany and France led to undercutting the
effectiveness of the SGP, which helped foster an environment of fiscal irresponsibility in several
countries, especially Greece, according to Wihlborg (2010, p. 22).
The EC’s failing to impose the appropriate penalties, as well as negative precedent set by
Germany and France, were indeed significant factors contributing to increases of the public debt
and deficit of the PIIG countries. However, as these factors did contribute to the fiscal
irresponsibility of these countries, it is important to note that the massive public debt was also
largely fueled by European funds from private and central banks in the low interest rate
environment. But more importantly, PIIG countries were investing in an unsustainable growth
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model, which will be discussed in the following section. The whole system could have worked
properly as long as PIIG countries had to opportunity to refinance its debt, yet the PIIG
economies remained institutionally weak and vulnerable. The global financial crisis of 20072008 would reveal these weaknesses.
Once the financial crisis of 2007-08 hit the Eurozone, Germany took on further debt in
order to provide for further fiscal stimulus. The increased fiscal stimulus in return would increase
public spending to ease the effects of the financial crisis. Numerous EU countries imitated this
plan of action. Unlike Germany, the majority of these countries did not have the financial
standing to do so, since they were more deeply indebted. As the fallout of the global economic
crisis was escalating, the European Commission was very concerned Greece’s spiraling public
debt, as it began to affect the stability of the euro. The Commission was also particularly
concerned about levels of public debt in Ireland, Spain, Italy and France.
More specifically, Greece –as the weakest link in the Eurozone – rapidly became the
target of aggressive speculation, as many saw an opportunity to benefit from volatile markets
dealing with sovereign credit default swaps. Rating agencies subsequently started to downgrade
Greek bank and government debt. Over time, international investors and lenders became
increasingly nervous that the Greek government’s public debt was unsustainable and that it
would default on its debt. Thus, they started demanding higher interest rates for buying and
holding Greek bonds, which drove up Greece’s borrowing costs (see Appendix 3 for more
detail), exacerbated its debt levels, and caused Greece to veer towards default. This would cause
the debt crisis to spiral out of control, engulfing not only Portugal and Ireland, but also much
larger economies such as Spain and Italy, all of which were on the periphery with similar nearunsustainable public finances.
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3.4 Structural Issues
Policy makers adopted a very short-term perspective. Every country, which wanted to
participate in the EMU, had to comply with monetary and fiscal economic targets. Even though a
“strict” mechanism of implementing macroeconomic conditions was in place, a specific
mechanism for the coordination of the implementation of structural reforms did not exist. Policy
makers built a common currency area without an adequate economic governance to harmonize
and coordinate economic policies across the EMU. They did not predict the economic and
institutional implications of a future debt-crisis. Actually, they believed that this was impossible
to happen, and did not proceed further in the political union to establish common economic
policies and common economic institutions.
Furthermore, these policy makers clearly did not address the concerns of both
traditionalist and modern optimal currency area economists regarding meeting the criteria for an
economically efficient common currency area. Wihlborg (2010, p. 4) points out that one of the
most important criteria based on Mundell (1961) is that “economies in a currency area should
have considerable flexibility in terms of factor mobility and/or wage and price flexibility in order
to allow economic adjustments without provoking recessions in the absence of the ability to
change national exchange rates and, thereby, relative costs.” As previously mentioned, Kroger
and Redonnet (2001) emphasized the use of using real convergence criteria, like factor mobility
and/or wage and price flexibility, in addressing if a single monetary policy can handle
asymmetric economic developments within different countries once they share a common
currency area. This criterion, nonetheless, was not included in the Maastricht Treaty or the SGP,
and hence, was not satisfied by a several of the entering Eurozone members.
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Once economists recognized that this real convergence was not included, they assumed
changes in economic structure would emerge from participation in a shared common currency
area. The endogenous OCA theory was right in demonstrating that the conditions after, not
before, the formation of the Eurozone was more relevant to its successful operation as a common
currency area, partially refuting Kroger and Redonnet’s (2001) argument. The Eurozone
members did positively converge towards meeting several of the optimal currency area criteria,
specifically with trade, however they had more problematic issues with regards to more
flexibility in labor markets and asymmetric economic developments. It is important to note that
the convergence “movements needed to be strong enough to substantially improve the workings
of the internal adjustment process and reduce the generation of disturbances for which
adjustment would be needed”, according Wihlborg (2010, p. 4). The reasoning behind this lack
of convergence was the unaccounted excessive pressures from political economy forces and
distorted incentives. The threat of not being able to join the euro area, which led to an initial
success with fiscal consolidation in Europe, was also no longer there. Thus, almost as soon as the
euro had been introduced, consolidation fatigue set in, and not only fiscal policies, but more
importantly, structural reforms were relaxed.
With bullish markets in addition to easy financing, the PIIG countries, especially Greece,
fell to the threats of excessive pressures from the traditional economic sectors, the use of easy
access to credit to finance domestic private and public consumption, neglect the requirements of
sustainable growth, and more importantly, the idea that the single currency was the adequate
condition for economic convergence without more structural effort in direction of high
productivity and competitiveness. Furthermore, the European structural funds and borrowed
funds were not channeled into productive investments that would generate future growth and
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increase competiveness of the economy. Instead, those capital flows and the easy access to credit
were used to fund public and private consumption. Germany and France, on the other hand,
stayed fairly disciplined competitively than most Eurozone countries, and thus were able to ease
the effects of the financial crisis through taking “the injunction that joining an area of fixed
exchange rates greatly increased the need for improving the internal flexibility of economies”,
according to Wihlborg (2010, p. 22).

3.5 Conclusion
The Eurozone countries had an extraordinary opportunity to pave the way for rapid
economic development and modernization, with sustainable growth rates, and new, open and
high quality economic and political institutions after joining the common currency area. This
economic environment was truly favorable. More specifically, the macroeconomic conditions,
the hard currency, the high investors’ confidence, and the opportunity to access international
capital markets for cheap credit were the most appropriate requirements. Nonetheless, the ability
to exploit these advantages properly for certain countries, specifically the PIIG countries, was
largely based on two major conditions: maintain fiscal discipline and sound finances, while
increasing the productivity and the competitiveness of their respective economies. Despite all the
PIIG countries failing to maintain fiscal discipline, certain PIIG countries, such as Greece, failed
to maintain competiveness in international markets. It would have been sufficient, if they had
used the borrowed funds to spur production capacity, including the export sector.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Diverging Competitiveness among Key Eurozone Nations

4.1 Introduction
Certain PIIG countries within the Eurozone had the idea that the common currency was
an adequate condition for economic convergence without more structural effort in direction of
high productivity and competitiveness. The costs of entering the EU for these countries was
forgoing an independent exchange rate and no longer having an independent monetary policy,
where sovereign governments can no longer manage the exchange rate so as to address the
country’s international competitiveness issues nor can they influence the money supply so as to
address aggregate demand and/or inflation/deflation problems. These member states can
therefore only compete in international markets with their fixed exchange rates where adjusting
unit labor costs is their main option. More specifically, in order to address international
competitiveness issues, the only two options left under the Eurozone are wage decreases and/or
productivity enhancements. In this chapter, we will start by examining the current account
balances of Germany, France, and the PIIG countries in subsection 4.2. We will then turn to an
examination of the unit labor costs, productivity, and hourly wage rate between Germany and
Greece in subsection 4.3, followed by Germany and Ireland in subsection 4.4. An examination of
these variables will also be done with the remaining select Eurozone countries in subsection 4.5.

4.2 Current Account Balance
Although it is widely acknowledged that Eurozone’s elites need to address unsustainable
fiscal conditions in deficit countries, they must also address their lack of competitiveness. This
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lack of competitiveness can be observed through examining the current account balances of
select Eurozone countries, as Figure 3 and Current Account Balance Table show.
Figure 4.1

Source: OECD (Refer to Appendix 4)

Source: OECD (Refer to Appendix 4 for additional data)
In assessing the current account balances of France and Germany, these countries have
substantially improved their current account balance, especially Germany, since the creation of
the euro. Moreover, Germany running a big surplus can be attributed to not only its industrial
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nature, but also its initiative in reducing manufacturing costs, according to Krugman (2015, p.
576).
In contrast, current account deficits expanded, and in some cases to staggeringly, large
levels for Greece and Portugal. By 2008, Greece and Portugal respectively reached the
unprecedented deficit of 15.1 and 12.1 percent of their output. The slowly improving, yet
staggering current account deficit levels of Greece and Portugal raised flags, indicating their
export prices were too high in terms of international competitiveness. It is important to
understand that Portugal and Greece under the fixed euro currency would have to turn to
decreasing its respective unit labor costs through depressing wages and/or improving its
productivity in an effort to restore their export price indices competitiveness. This situation in
which Portugal and Greece experienced a negative demand shock in a fixed-rate regime and its
consequences is mentioned in Kenen’s (1969) examination of degree of product diversification.
He points out the undesirable effects that may occur for a single-product economy if it
experiences a negative demand shock in a fixed-rate regime. Kenen goes on to demonstrate that
the adjustment to this fall in export revenue under a fixed exchange rate regime would have to be
unfavorably tackled through a reduction of wages and prices, since currency devaluation is not
an option. Hence, Kenen argues that being a member of a common currency area with a single
product economy is not as attractive and/or beneficial as it seems. Finally, the fact that Greece, a
limited, diversified economy, experienced similar unfavorable consequences to that of a singleproduct after experiencing a negative demand shock strengthens Kenen’s argument.
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Productivity, Unit Labor Costs, and Hourly Wage Rates: Germany v. Greece
To begin, labor productivity rates among the selected Eurozone countries are another
important aspect that needs to be assessed. Similar rates of labor productivity are important for
Eurozone countries because if they have diverging rates, then there is very limited action that the
EMS can take to ease these disparities. Without an independent monetary policy, sovereign
nation-states no longer have the luxury of devaluing its currency in order to restore
competitiveness. Therefore, those members of the Eurozone must turn to wage decreases and/or
productivity enhancement as a result.
Furthermore, in assessing the correlation and trends between unit labor costs,
productivity, and labor costs per hour between select Eurozone countries, one will be able to
notice if there are any notable divergences in labor productivity trends. It is important to note
that certain figures below contain normalized data. This normalized data has a clarity element to
it compared to actual data. Moreover, I presented the normalized data because they are unit free,
allowing one to look at the correlation and trends between unit labor costs, productivity, and
labor costs per hour. The way the data is normalized for each data series in EViews is in the
following equation:

𝑋𝑡 $%̅

'

, where Xt is the actual observation of the respective variable for each

year, x̅ is the average of all observations of the respective variable for the sample period, and S
is the standard deviation of all observations of the respective variable for the sample period. The
normalized data allows for compiling data that have different units and/or are on different scales.
Now, we will examine the trends in the factors mentioned above between Germany and Greece
in the following charts.
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Figure 4.2

Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics
Figure 4.3

Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics
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Figure 4.4

Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics
Figure 4.5

Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics
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In Figure 5, Germany shows a steady upward trend in productivity growth, while its unit
labor costs took a dip between 2003 and 2009. Turning to Figure 4, the nation’s hourly wage rate
has also steadily increased since 2004 until the end of the Global Financial Crisis, and then
increased up until 2016. It can also be noted that once Germany approximately entered the
Eurozone, its productivity started to trend above its unit labor costs for the majority of its time,
right up until 2012. Even though its units labor costs rate rose higher than its productivity after
2012, which could be considered a threat to Germany’s competitiveness, its hourly wage rate
stayed aligned with its productivity growth.
Greece, on the other hand, showed a rapid increase in productivity growth from 1995
until 2009, where it slightly more than doubled its level of productivity from approximately 11 to
24 GDP per hour worked in euros according to Figure 7. The nation’s unit labor cost quickly
increased from 1995 until 2010, where it also slightly more than doubled from approximately 47
to 100. The alignment of both the rapid productivity and unit labor cost rates were also cyclical,
depicted in Figure 5. The catch, nonetheless, is that Germany increased its level of productivity
at a sizeable, yet gradual rate from approximately 33 to 52 GDP per hour worked in euros, while
simultaneously having a moderate growth in unit labor costs when compared to Greece in the
span of 1995 until 2015.
Additionally, Greece’s hourly wage rate skyrocketed from 2004 until 2008. It is
important to note that its hourly wage growth was roughly aligned with productivity up until
2008. After 2008, a steady decline in both productivity and unit labor costs occurred in Greece.
More importantly, the unit labor costs was above its productivity rate for the majority of this
decline, indicating a strong threat to its cost competitiveness, if other costs were not adjusted in
compensation. Greece’s hourly wage rate also immediately plummeted afterward, nowhere near
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being aligned with the declining trends of productivity and unit labor costs after the Financial
Crisis. Besides a dive in hourly wage growth a few years after the financial crisis for Portugal
(refer to Appendix 6B), the significant wage decreases that Greece experienced did not occur in
neither Germany, France, or its other PIIG peers.
An important observation from this comparison is the steady trend in productivity growth
in Germany, and a decline in productivity in Greece starting around 2008. This is a crucial
problem according to OCA literature because countries sharing a common currency should
maintain similar productivity rates, since there is very limited action that the EMS can take to fix
this misalignment. It is important to understand that if Greece had its own currency in the
situation, it could have devalued its currency to maintain competitiveness. However, lacking its
independent monetary policy, it went through a painful period of wage decreases from 2008 until
2014 in trying to maintain its competitiveness. Therefore, it seems that the wage decreases, while
contributing to a decline in current account deficit as a percentage of GDP (e.g. from -15.2 in
2007 to -11.4 in 2010), was not sufficient. This is because productivity declines did not help, and
of course, no currency devaluation could be performed.
Furthermore, Mundell (1961) proposed labor mobility, wage and price flexibility, as well
as the incidence of asymmetric shocks as the most relevant attributes for judging the optimality
of a currency area. Wihlborg (2010, p. 4) also points out how Mundell states “economies in a
currency area should have considerable flexibility in terms of factor mobility and/or wage and
price flexibility in order to allow economic adjustments without provoking recessions in the
absence of the ability to change national exchange rates and, thereby, relative costs.” More
specifically, Mundell outlines an ideal situation of wage and price flexibility in which a region,
such as Germany, has an obligation to increase its domestic demand at a greater rate to assist
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with the adjustment of imbalances for another region, such as Greece, within the Eurozone. This
adjustment by Germany would result in fewer products being bought in its own nation, while
more products being bought in Greece, therefore providing evidence of wage and price flexibility
restoring stability in the incident of asymmetric shocks in a common currency area.
However, in the examination of data of Germany and Greece, Germany went from a
current account balance of 4.6 in 2005 to 5.6 in 2010, while Greece went from a current account
balance of -8.9 in 2005 to -11.4 in 2010 after undergoing the Great Recession. This situation
between Germany and Greece indicates wage and price stickiness in the Eurozone, since neither
a decrease in Germany’s current account balance nor an increase in Greece’s current account
balance occurred to restore stability in light of an asymmetric shock. Therefore, Mundell argues
that not only wage and price flexibility fails to exist in the Eurozone, but also suggests that these
existing members are not making this common currency area as stable as it seems.

Productivity, Unit Labor Costs, and Hourly Wage Rates: Germany v. Ireland
Now, we will examine the trends in the factors mentioned above between Germany and
Ireland in the following charts.
Figure 4.6

37

Figure 4.7

Figure 9

Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics
Figure 4.8

Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics
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Figure 4.9

Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics
Ireland has an interesting relationship concerning its rate of productivity, unit labor costs,
as well as current account balance compared to its fellow PIIG countries. This Eurozone member
state beginning from 1995 until around 2005 had steady upward trends in both productivity and
unit labor costs rates, where the rate of productivity was slightly above the rate of unit labor costs
according to Figure 8. In the following years from 2005 until 2008, the unit labor costs
significantly spiked up, which was also accompanied by widening current account deficit from
-3.5 to -6.5 percentage of GDP. The reasoning behind this decrease in Ireland’s competitiveness
was that its increasing unit labor costs made the nation’s export price indices less competitive, or
an increase in its export price, in international markets and hence decreasing its exports, which is
demonstrated through its declining current account balance. Furthermore, the rate of
productivity, on the other hand, during the Great Recession slightly dipped, but more importantly
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has steadily risen since 2009 until 2015. It is interesting to note that Ireland’s level of
productivity in the span of 1995 to 2015 increased approximately from 20 to 74 GDP per hour
worked in euros according to Figure 10. Ireland’s sizable increase in its productivity capacity
was not only larger than Germany’s, but also significantly more than any of its PIIG peers from
this time span.
In addition to the rate of productivity increasing, Ireland has an interesting trend in that
its unit labor costs decreased dramatically compared to its PIIG peers since 2009. It is important
to note that this significant decrease in its unit labor costs was also supplemented with significant
increase in its current account balance, which went from a deficit of -6.5 percentage of GDP in
2008 to a surplus of 10.2 percentage of GDP in 2015. Moreover, given the high output Ireland’s
economy receives relative to its wages, alongside its increasing productivity rates, the nation
promoted a sufficient growth model based on productivity enhancement in restoring its
competitiveness in the international market. The significant increase in Ireland’s current account
balance from 2008 to 2015 provides further evidence that Ireland’s productivity enhancement
was sufficient in producing goods at a competitive export price in international markets without
the need to devalue wages.

Productivity, Unit Labor Costs, and Hourly Wage Rates of Remaining Countries
The remaining countries that need to be examined include France, Portugal, and Italy.
First off, France is quite comparable to Germany, as the nation shows a strong, steady upward
trend in both productivity and unit labor costs rates. Once France approximately entered the
Eurozone, its productivity started to trend above its unit labor costs up until around 2009, and
then the respective variables aligned cyclically thereafter (refer to Appendix 6A). More
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specifically, France increased its level of productivity at a sizeable, yet gradual rate from
approximately 32 to 54 GDP per hour worked in euros, while simultaneously having a moderate
growth in unit labor costs from 1995 until 2015 (refer to Appendix 7A). The Eurozone member
state’s hourly wage rate rapidly increased from 2004 until 2012, and eventually aligned just
below both productivity and unit labor costs after 2012. France overall demonstrates relatively
uniform shifts in productivity, unit labor costs, as well as hourly wages to Germany, maintaining
its international competitiveness.
Turning to Portugal, the nation exhibits steady growth trends in both its productivity and
unit labor costs. Unlike France, Germany, and Italy, once Portugal approximately entered the
Eurozone, its unit labor cost rate rose higher than its productivity rate up until 2011. This
indicates that Portugal’s unit labor costs are too expensive to be competitive in international
markets, as the per unit labor cost exceeds the per unit productivity. The trend was also
accompanied by its hourly wage rate increasing from 2004 to 2012, where it eventually
surpassed Portugal’s productivity rate in 2012 (refer to Appendix 6B). Since Portugal workers
are less competitive via productivity rates, the nation turned to depressing their worker’s wages
(e.g. from 2012 to 2014 in Appendix 6B) in an effort to reduce the cost of production to restore
its competitiveness in the international market. Even though we do see wages decline in
Portugal, since the nation could not devalue its currency under the Eurozone, Portugal’s
productivity rate steadily increased, quite noticeably above its unit labor costs since 2012.
Nonetheless, Portugal’s restoration of its export price competitiveness through its adjustments
mentioned remains uncertain after examining its current account balance (e.g. -1.8 in 2012 to 0.4
2015).
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The last selected Eurozone country of examination is Italy, which displays upward trends
for both productivity and unit labor costs. Once Italy entered the Eurozone, its productivity
started to trend above its unit labor costs up until around 2009, and then the respective variables
aligned cyclically thereafter (refer to Appendix 6C). Moreover, the nation’s hourly wage rate
rapidly increased from 2004 until 2012, and eventually aligned just below both productivity and
unit labor costs after 2012. Italy’s trends overall demonstrate that the adjustment in its
productivity enhancement, alongside forgoing wage decreases, while contributing to a rise in
current account balance as a percentage of GDP (e.g. from -2.8 in 2008 to 1.9 in 2014), was
sufficient in maintaining its competitiveness in international markets.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion and Considerations for Follow Up
Optimal currency area theory provided me with a useful framework for determining
whether a Eurozone member nation should continue being a part of the common currency area.
The results from my findings in Chapter 4 showed us that the euro would best serve the
economic interests of each of its members if steady trends in productivity growth were
accompanied by competitive wages and moderate growth in unit labor costs. In the case of
Germany, France, and Italy from the PIIG nations, these countries demonstrated that the loss of
monetary independence and flexible exchange rate were not high costs for these key countries. It
is important to note that steady trends in productivity growth, which were also growing faster
than their respective rates of unit labor costs for the majority of the period, occurred in these
countries from the beginning of the euro until 2015. Therefore, the trends in Germany, France, as
well as Italy, demonstrate that the adjustment in their productivity enhancements, alongside
forgoing wage decreases, while contributing to increases in their respective current account
balances as a percentage of GDP, was sufficient in maintaining competitiveness in international
markets.
Furthermore, Ireland has a unique case, where its unit labor costs significantly spiked up,
which was also accompanied by widening current account deficit from 2005 until 2008, after
experiencing steady productivity rate trends in its early membership in the euro. The reasoning
behind this decrease in Ireland’s competitiveness was that its increasing unit labor costs made the
nation’s export price indices less competitive in international markets and thus decreasing its
exports, which is demonstrated through its declining current account balance. Soon enough,
nonetheless, Ireland’s rate of productivity recovered and then increased significantly, while its
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unit labor costs have simultaneously decreased dramatically since 2009. These trends in Ireland’s
economy demonstrate how the nation implemented a sufficient growth model based on
productivity enhancement in restoring its competitiveness in the international market. The
significant increase in Ireland’s current account balance after the Great Recession provides
further evidence that Ireland’s productivity enhancement was sufficient in producing goods at a
competitive export price in international markets without the need to devalue wages.
After the examination of productivity, unit labor costs, hourly wage rates, and net export
performance as a percentage of GDP of Germany, France, Italy, and Ireland, I argue that there is
sufficient, positive economic convergence and performance in terms of international
competitiveness under the uniform policy of the ECB for these countries since joining the
Eurozone. Moreover, I conclude that these countries should continue being members of
Eurozone, since these countries could compete with their fixed euro, while simultaneously
increasing their export price competitiveness in international markets through productivity
enhancement, forgoing the depression of wages. Moreover, they benefit from the positive aspects
of a monetary union.
On the other hand, trends in Portugal, and especially Greece, indicated that both countries
have an underlying structural deficit in comparison to Germany, France, Italy, and Ireland. The
reasoning behind this underlying structural deficit is that consolidation fatigue quickly set in
these countries after joining the Eurozone, resulting in stagnant structural efforts towards using
borrowed funds to spur their production capacities, especially their export sectors. Unlike the
previously mentioned countries, both Greece and Portugal experienced unit labor costs growing
at a faster rate than productivity rates, indicating international competitiveness issues, such as
export products becoming too expensive in international markets.

44

Furthermore, I reiterate the fact that Greece is in a far worse economic position
compared to Portugal, as it went through a painful period of wage devaluation from 2008 until
2014. Both members of the EMU turned to depressing wages in expectations of unit labor costs
to decrease, making the nation’s export price indices more competitive and therefore increasing
its net export performance as a percentage of GDP. It is important to recap that Greece and
Portugal could not turn to devalue their individual currency since they are both members under
the euro where they no longer have control over their exchange rates. Hence, the only two
options left as adjustment mechanisms for them are wage decreases and productivity
enhancements.
However, in the case of Greece, even though we do see wage declines, we do not see
productivity enhancements and we do not see a dramatic improvement in its current account
balance. Therefore, all the above facts, support that the conclusion that Greece would be better
off leaving the Eurozone, and as a result, regaining control over its domestic monetary policy,
such as performing exchange rate devaluation, making its export price indices more competitive
and thus increasing its net export performance as a percentage of GDP. In the case of Portugal,
even though we do see wages decline, not nearly to the same extent as Greece, we do see
productivity enhancements, but do not see a drastic improvement in its net export performance as
a percentage of GDP. Thus, as of right now, it seems reasonable for Portugal to remain in the
Eurozone, since it has observed a steady increase in its productivity rate, quite noticeably above
its unit labor costs since 2012. Portugal’s needs to focus on significantly improving its current
account balance through great productivity enhancement and/or reasonable wage depression in
the immediate future in order to avoid Greece’s future path.
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Apart from the current account balances, productivity, unit labor costs, and hourly wage
rate evidence that I provided in this paper, an interesting and relevant avenue of future research
would be to examine the export price indices for the select Eurozone countries in my sample.
Examining export price indices would provide further valuable insight because it correlates with
two sides of this study. On the one hand, export price indices would correlate with both
productivity and unit labor costs trends, providing evidence as to whether or not decreases in this
variable are attributable to lower unit labor costs within the country. On the other hand, export
price indices might correlate with current account balances, providing evidence regarding the
strength of the relationship between export prices and net current account performance. The
results from this examination would be further evidence as to whether or not a member state in
the Eurozone should reconsider regaining its control over domestic monetary policy, forgoing
the euro and the common currency area.
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Appendixes
Appendix 1

Source: OCED
Appendix 2

Source: OCED
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Appendix 3

Source: OCED
Appendix 4 (Numbering Continued From Chapter 3)

Source: OECD
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Appendix 5A

Source: OECD

Appendix 5B

Source: OCED
Source: OECD
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Appendix 5C

Source: Haver Analytics
Source (EU 19): OECD
Appendix 5D

Source: Haver Analytics
Source (EU 19): OECD
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Appendix 5E

Source: Eurostat

Appendix 5F

Source: Eurostat

Appendix 5G

Source: Eurostat & OECD
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Appendix 5H*

Source: Eurostat
*Methodology:
After calculating the annual growth rate percentages for both ULC Index and Labor Costs
per Hour in Euro, I determined that the annual percentages in Appendix 5G were comparable.
Afterwards, I took the annual growth rates that I have calculated in Appendix 5F, and then did an
interpolation between 2004-2008 and again for 2008-2012 for each country and EU19.
More specifically, in the case of Greece, starting from 2004, which 15.3 is the labor costs
per hour in euro in Appendix 5E, and then applied the growth rate of 2.3657 (respectively under
Greece’s column for the 2004-2008 row in Appendix 5f). This allowed me to interpolate the
approximate hourly wage rate of 15.7 for Greece in 2005. I followed this procedure over and
over to fill in the gaps until I reached 2008. From 2008, I applied the growth rate of -1.6787%,
and proceeded with the same steps. Finally, I continued this procedure for each of remaining
countries.
Appendix 6A
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Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics)
Appendix 6B

Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics)
Appendix 6C

Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics)
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Appendix 6D

Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics)
Appendix 7A

Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics)
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Appendix 7B

Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics)
Appendix 7C

Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics)
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Appendix 7D

Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics)
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Data Description
CODE
COUNTRY ACRONYM

Data Description

Source

OECD

PROGE; PROGR; PROITL; PROIRE;
PROFRA; PROPOR; PROITA; PROEU

Level of GDP per capita and
productivity, GDP per hour worked
in national currency (current prices),
1995-2015

ULC “COUNTRY ACRONYM”:
ULCGE; ULCGR; UCLITL; ULCIRE;
ULCFRA; ULCPOR ULCITA; ULCEU

Unit labor costs, By persons
employed (Total Economy),
2010=100, 1995 – 2016

Haver
Analytics

LABEUR “COUNTRY ACRONYM”:

Labor costs per Hour in Euro, whole
economy (excluding agriculture and
public administration), 2004-2014

Eurostat

GEà Germany
GRà Greece
ITLà Italy
IRLà Ireland
FRAà France
EU à Eurozone (19)
PRO“COUNTRY ACRONYM”:

LABEURGE; LABEURGR;
LABEURITL; LABEURIRE;
LABEURFRA; LABEURPOR;
LABEURITA; LABEUREU
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